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Abstract 
 
This article examines the structural and spatial organization of violent extremist 
organizations (VEOs) across the Sahara. Building on the Armed Conflict Location 
and Event Dataset (ACLED), a public collection of political violence data for 
developing states, the article investigates structural connections of VEOs and the 
effect of borders on the spatial patterns of armed groups. Social network analysis 
reveals that the network involving VEOs had a low density, a low level of 
transitivity, and contained few central actors, three typical characteristics of 
negative-tie networks. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is unquestionably 
the most connected VEO, which in purely network terms can be seen as a liability. 
Spatial analysis shows that, while violence was almost exclusively concentrated 
within Algeria between 1997 and 2004, cross-border movements intensified in the 
mid-2000s following the establishment of military bases by AQIM in Mali. As of 
late, VEOs have primarily concentrated their operations in Northern Mali as well as 
Southern Algeria, whereas Mauritania, Niger and Chad have been relatively 
unaffected. It follows that deterrence and containment strategies should be devised 
for regions rather than states. The findings have significant implications for 
multinational security and stability operations and the need to coordinate 
transnationally. 
Keywords: violent extremist organizations, terrorism, borders, social networks, 
Africa, Sahel, Sahara 
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1. Introduction 
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) and local militias thrive on the vacuum of power that 
afflicts many states in North Africa. The malaise has been exacerbated by the breakdown in 
governance that followed the Arab Spring’s unrest and led terrorist groups and competing 
militias to expand their areas of operation (Zimmerman 2013). Decades of support for 
authoritarian rulers by external actors such as Russia and Iran, the monarchies of the Gulf, and 
the West, further hollowed out state and society throughout the region to such a degree that the 
state’s monopoly of violence has been eroding. In Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Tunisia, a plethora 
of non-state actors now possess means of violence that used to be the sole purview of states. The 
most dangerous groups are composites of terrorist association and militia that instrumentalize a 
firebrand version of Islam to pursue an expansionist ideological project whose aim is to 
overcome conventional sovereignty states. 
 
Further south, political and religious violence has been surging. Better known for episodes of 
drought and occasional acts of banditry, West Africa has progressively become a battleground 
for Islamists seeking to impose sharia, rebels seeking independence, transnational traffickers, 
and former colonial powers struggling to project their influence by bolstering the territorial 
integrity of states. At the peak of the Malian crisis in 2012, a temporary coalition of Tuareg 
rebels and VEOs affiliated with Al Qaeda controlled an area about the size of Texas. They were 
routed by the French-led Opération Serval in 2013. More recently, Boko Haram has been striving 
to establish a caliphate over a large part of the Northeastern Nigerian border region, killing 
thousands and forcing more than half a million civilians to flee their country (Zenn 2012, 
UNHCR 2015). 
 
The conflicts in Mali and Nigeria exemplify the complexities of instability fuelled by rebellions, 
religious extremism, and transnational organized crime in the Trans-Saharan region. It also sheds 
light on the nature of Trans-Saharan conflicts that are characterized by shifting loyalties of 
individuals to combatant groups. Personal allegiances of commanders and rank-and-file fighters 
change as new opportunities arise, military personnel frequently join secessionist rebels, while 
rebels may occasionally join with VEOs, depending on local circumstances and tribal allegiances 
(Walther and Christopoulos 2013). As Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
3 
or the Polisario Front illustrate, cross-border mobility is another important part of military 
strategy (Zenn 2014). Islamist groups and rebels capitalize on marital, political, and financial ties 
throughout the region. As a result, they are not confined to one state. Instead, they move freely 
across sovereign state borders to attack targets, take hostages, and escape from security forces. 
 
Against this background, the objective of this article is to study both the structural and spatial 
organization of violent extremism in the Trans-Saharan region. Building on the Armed Conflict 
Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), a comprehensive public collection of political violence 
data for developing states, the article investigates structural connections among VEOs. It uses 
social network analysis (SNA) to represent actors involved in violent events between 1997 and 
2014 and analyze their structural position. Then it analyzes spatial patterns of violence across the 
Sahara and the role of state borders on the spatial patterns of armed groups. The article maps 
violent events in which 37 VEOs operating across the Sahara have been involved and specific 
spatial patterns that emerge from a chronological record of events. 
 
SNA shows that violent events cluster regionally. Fatalities are concentrated in Nigeria, Northern 
Algeria, Northern Libya, and the Gulf of Guinea. With the exception of Northern Mali, the Sahel 
and the Sahara have been less affected by violence than the rest of the region. In many conflicts 
civilians have paid the highest price, especially in Nigeria and Algeria where civilians have been 
victims of VEOs, military forces, and various militias. Spatial analysis suggests that violent 
events involving VEOs have followed different patterns depending on the period under 
consideration: between 1997 and 2004 violence was almost exclusively concentrated within 
Algeria between, but cross-border movements have intensified since, following the establishment 
of military bases by AQIM in Mali. More recently, VEOs have concentrated their operations in 
Northern Mali as well as in Southern Algeria, leaving Mauritania, Niger and Chad relatively 
unscathed. 
 
These spatial patterns of violent extremism suggest that deterrence and containment strategies 
need to be devised at the regional level rather than at the level of states. The findings have 
significant implications for collective security and stability operations and transnational 
coordination. On the one hand, existing institutions need to be reinforced. Yet, regional 
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institutions’ ability to solve collective action problems is limited: other than the African Union 
(Morocco excepted) and the United Nations, many of the affected states do not belong to the 
same regional organizations. Moreover, these institutions objectives tend to be political and 
economic. Notably absent are transnational security organizations. Is it mere coincidence that 
violent transnational non-state actors are strongest and most problematic in a region that is 
largely devoid of collective security institutions? 
 
2. VEOs, geography and borders 
 
2.1. The geography of VEOs 
 
Space is now widely recognized as a fundamental dimension of terrorists groups, which often 
conduct operations from a territorial base, leverage geographic havens, compete with sovereign 
states, and fight for control over aspirational homelands (Cutter et al. 2003, Flint 2003, Medina 
and Hepner 2008, 2013). As a result, an increasing number of scholars are examining social and 
spatial dimensions of terrorism. As Carley (2006: 3) argues: “If we look only at the social 
network then the focus of attention is on hierarchies, communication and other social relations. 
The addition of events and locations facilitates course of action analysis and enables linkage to 
various strategic planning tools”. Social scientists have hitherto investigated spatio-temporal 
patterns of terrorist activities along several lines of inquiry: some have considered places and 
distance by locating terror attacks and violent events and their co-occurrence and projecting 
social ties on geographic space (Krebs 2002, Medina and Hepner 2008, Baghat and Medina 
2013). This approach, which focusses on how proximity can influence the formation of social 
networks, helps us understand the way terrorist groups leverage resources such as social capital, 
infrastructure, or institutions, and how they communicate over vast distances (Sageman 2008). 
Other spatial features, such as territorial homogeneity (Dowd and Raleigh 2013) or contiguity 
(Flint et al. 2009, Medina and Hepner 2011), have been investigated to a lesser extent. Radil et 
al. (2010), for example, show that rivalry among urban gangs in Los Angeles produces distinct 
spatial patterns depending on whether the groups are close geographically or topologically. 
Spatializing social networks, the authors argue, gives better results than conventional spatial 
analysis that ignores social interactions or typical SNA that would not consider geography. 
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Such developments have been enabled by new algorithmic techniques for clustering and anomaly 
detection (Skillicorn 2009), dynamic network analysis (Breiger et al. 2003, Carley 2006, 
Gelernter and Carley 2015) and geographical information systems (Berrebi and Lakdawalla 
2007, Guo et al. 2007, Medina and Hepner 2011, Gao et al. 2013, Hannigan et al. 2013). These 
new tools can now be applied to large databases, such as the University of Maryland Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), Jane’s Terrorism 
and Insurgency Center database (JTIC), or the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset 
(ACLED) used in this article. 
 
Recent conceptual and technical developments related to the spatiality of social networks have 
primarily been applied to case studies located in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 
Southeast Asia. By contrast, North and West Africa have received little attention from network 
science. The bulk of recent studies in the region focus predominantly on the historical 
development of terrorist groups (Gray and Stocham 2008, Emerson 2011, Cline 2013), on 
geopolitical challenges related to the rise of non-state actors (EU ISS 2014), and on 
counterterrorism measures (Larémont 2011, Lacher and Tull 2013, Sheehan and Porter 2014). In 
most of these studies, however, the social networks underlying political and religious movements 
and the spatial patterns of attacks are considered as two independent variables and are rarely 
analyzed in a formal way. 
 
The recent evolution of such groups as Boko Haram and AQIM has, however, called this 
approach into question by showing that the geographical diffusion of VEOs in West Africa 
follows established social networks among radicals (Guidère 2011, Menner 2014). As Perliger 
and Pedahzur (2011: 46) showed in a slightly different context, “many of the social networks 
engaging in terrorism existed long before they became involved in terrorism activities”. This 
rings true particularly when VEOs extend their activities across sovereign borders, due to the 
uncertainty of operating in a foreign environment (Lacher 2012). In other words, the spatial 
strategies of VEOs are constrained by their own prior investment in social ties (friends and kin, 
coreligionists, countrymen) and by the overall structure of the network that favors actors that are 
structurally central over more peripheral ones. Current mobility patterns do not simply imitate 
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the old rules that governed trans-Saharan mobility in the past; they are necessary to maintain an 
investment in a social network of hosts and exchange partners without which mobility across the 
region would not be possible (Retaillé and Walther 2013). 
 
2.2. The effect of borders 
 
Border regions are crucial for the development of terrorist groups (Flint 2003: 165, Medina and 
Hepner 2008: 154, Hudson 2003). The most obvious reason is that, in many regions of the world, 
borderlands amount to ungoverned spaces whence terrorist groups can attack distant targets and 
minimize the risks of reprisals (Migdal 2004, Korteweg and Ehrhardt 2006, Brafman Kittner 
2007, Innes 2007, Gray and LaTour 2010, Campana and Ducol 2011). Sunni-dominated areas of 
the Syrian-Lebanon border, for example, are used as safe havens by Syrian opposition forces, 
whereas Shia-dominated areas are used by Hezbollah to launch attacks or enter Syria (U.S. 
Department of State 2014). Of the 59 terrorist groups designated by the U.S. Department of State 
in January 2014, 39 are thought to use a safe haven for their military operations (Arsenault and 
Bacon 2015). Our own research presented in Appendix 1 confirms that, for at least 26 terrorist 
groups, such safe havens span a border area. Interestingly, border sanctuaries used by political 
and religious groups are unevenly distributed and are mainly found in four regions of the world: 
(1) Pakistan-administered Kashmir, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan’s 
North Waziristan, Baluchistan, and Indian-administered Kashmir; (2) the Lebanon-Syria border, 
the Syria-Iraq borderlands, Southern Lebanon, and Kurdistan; (3) Colombia-Venezuela and 
Brazil-Paraguay-Argentina triangle; and (4) borders that straddle Algeria and Mali, Niger and 
Libya, and around the Lake Chad Basin, which are the primary focus of this article. 
 
In North and West Africa, border sanctuaries are largely found in the Sahel and Sahara where 
territorial discontinuities between states encourage the development of cross-border warfare 
(Walther 2014). Long considered as artifacts of colonial power, borders impose transaction costs 
that open markets of opportunity for rebels and jihadists that exploit weak states and their lack of 
intraregional cooperation, making transnational terrorism harder to address than domestic 
terrorism (Sandler 2011). Instead of being organized into territorial units, rebels and VEOs co-
operate along pre-existing marital, political, and financial networks with political allies and co-
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religionists that inhabit the area (Wilkinson 2012). That leaves the impression that they are 
elusive (Walther and Retaillé 2010). In a sparsely populated region the size of the United States, 
holding territory has always been pointless. Instead of garrisoning territory, Trans-Saharan 
terrorist groups aim to control cities and lines of communication. A similar strategy is adopted by 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), who controls of network of cities, roads, and 
military bases and oil resources across Syria and Iraq without forming a continuous territorial 
entity. Connected across both shores of the desert, these groups are governed by the fundamental 
principles of social flexibility and geographic mobility to fight an enemy that mainly relies on 
hierarchical structures and static armies. 
 
3. Combining social network and spatial analysis 
 
3.1. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset 
 
The analysis relies on data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), 
which provides a comprehensive list of political events by country from 1997 to 2014 (Raleigh 
and Dowd 2015, ACLED 2015a). The fifth version of the data was used to select 21 countries 
that were primordially concerned with violent activities in North and West Africa: Algeria, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, 
Liberia, Mauritania, Morocco, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Tunisia and 
Togo. Country data were compiled in a unique file and, because our analysis mainly focusses on 
political violence, only events coded as violent were selected. These include seven categories: 
Battle – no change of territory; Battle – Non-state actor overtakes territory; Battle – Government 
regains territory; Riots and protests; Violence against civilians; and Remote violence. Over the 
period under consideration, the dataset contains 23,533 violent events involving 1213 different 
actors. 
 
Since we are looking to gauge the social and spatial organization of VEOs, we selected all 
violent events involving actors that were clearly identified as VEOs in the database, excluding 
non-identified Islamist militias and Libyan militias (see Appendix 1). This produced a list of 
3014 events related to 37 groups totaling 25,872 fatalities from 1997 to 2014. Nine of these 37 
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groups showed significant activity across the Sahara and were particularly relevant to cross-
border movement between North and West Africa: Al Qaeda, Ansar Dine, Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Al Mourabitoun, Free Salafist Group 
(GSL), Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), Movement for Unity and Jihad in 
West Africa (MUJAO), and Those Who Signed in Blood. These groups were responsible for 
1513 violent events totaling 10,640 fatalities from 1997 to 2014. 
 
3.2. Social networks: connecting the groups 
 
Networks are the most important unit of analysis in understanding the formation and dynamics of 
terrorist organizations today. There has been a shift away from understanding terrorism only 
through the lens of individual or organizational analysis and instead study the social dynamics of 
networks as a whole (Perliger and Pedahzur 2011). Networks make it possible for terrorist 
groups to overcome the inherent problems of mobilization and communication between large 
numbers of people over distances. Social network analysis (SNA), therefore, is the study of the 
individual members, represented by the nodes of the network, and the relationships between 
these members, represented by the links. The pattern of exchanges between nodes over time is 
the bedrock of network analysis.  
 
SNA has a proven track-record of analyzing and disrupting terrorist networks (e.g. Carley et al. 
2003, Sageman 2004, Everton 2013, Duijn et al. 2014). This has not always been the case; 
traditionally, terrorist networks were believed to be hierarchical and centralized. This was based 
on a historical conception of terrorist groups as operating like hierarchical corporations (Stohl 
and Stohl 2007). This view has remained popular even in the recent “Global War On Terror” 
(Zimmerman 2013). SNA, however, seeks to understand networks by mapping out the ties 
between the various nodes in the group as they are rather than how they ought to be or are 
expected to be. This allows investigators to determine the structure and function of both the 
network as a whole, and the role of each person in the group in relation to others. 
 
To study structural relations between actors involved in violent events we built a table – known 
as an adjacency matrix – in which the rows and columns contained the name of all the actors. An 
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entry in row a and column b represents a violent event between Actor a and Actor b. We counted 
the number of times the actors had been mutually involved in clashes and considered the number 
of fatalities as the entries of the matrix of relations. A zero indicates no tie and a negative value 
(-1) indicates an event without casualties. Note that because ACLED only reports the number of 
fatalities by event, it is not possible to assign a precise number of fatalities by group. Since ties 
between actors are reciprocal, the matrix is undirected and symmetric. The matrix can then be 
used to produce a graph or sociogram, which is a visual representation of the relationships 
between actors, and calculate several measures of centrality based on the structural position of 
each actor. 
 
3.3. The spatiality of VEOs: connecting the dots 
 
To understand the spatial strategies of VEOs in the region, we started by mapping violent events 
listed in the ACLED dataset using their geographical coordinates. In a region where non-state 
actors are notoriously mobile, locating violent events is, however, not entirely satisfactory 
because it does not reflect the ability of actors to move throughout states or mobilize personal 
and tribal networks to strike from a distance. In the absence of reliable data on the movement of 
VEOs, one of the challenges of our spatial analysis was to understand the spatiality of VEOs and 
the importance of sovereign borders based on immutable locations. 
 
This was achieved by developing two scenarios. The first scenario (“mobility”) assumes that 
violent events follow a linear chain of events, with VEOs moving from one location to the next, 
possibly across borders, without returning to their original location. This would reflect the 
strategy of a group under intense pressure from security forces, or, alternatively, of a VEO 
mastering the constraints of moving in an arid environment. The second scenario (“sanctuary”) 
assumes that violent events are limited to a particular region whence VEOs operate across 
borders. This scenario supposes a territorial turf and a clear origin of flows, such as the Kabylie 
region in Algeria for the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat or the Maiduguri region in 
Nigeria for Boko Haram. The difference between the two scenarios is explained in Figure 1, 
which presents six events for which the exact location (coded from 1 to 5) is known in two 
countries (A and B). On the left, groups constantly move from one location to another through 
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four movements, crossing the border on one occasion. On the right, violent events were located 
in different countries but followed a sanctuary pattern that lead groups to return to their point of 
origin. In the database, this would be reflected in a succession of events alternating across 
different countries. 
 
Figure 1. Mobility and sanctuary scenarios 
 
Source: Walther 2015 
 
Once sorted chronologically, we verified whether two successive violent events were located in 
the same country (or not) and whether spatial patterns followed a “mobility” or a “sanctuary” 
scenario by looking at the location of events. The limitation of this approach is that if one group 
decides to operate exclusively across the border without ever clashing with another group in the 
same country, no violent event will be recorded and the sanctuary pattern will be impossible to 
detect using the ACLED database. 
 
Instead of mapping the spatial patterns of each of the Trans-Saharan groups, we aggregate the 
events in which they were involved. The rationale is that trans-Saharan VEOs form several 
components of a single, flexible network, rather than independent entities. As reminded by 
Hagen (2014: 2), “AQIM overlaps with a number of nominally independent and ‘locally-
focused’ groups, such as Ansar al Din and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa. 
These groups are part of the larger AQ family and cannot be separated from AQ and AQIM”. 
Mergers, name changes and splits are common among them: for example, the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat (GSPC) – a splinter group of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria 
– rebranded itself as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2007. Some of its members 
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broke off in 2011 to form the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) while 
others formed Al Moulathamoun (2012) and Al Mouakaoune Biddam (2012), a group under the 
command of Mokhtar Belmokhtar (Wojtanik 2015). In 2013, MUJAO merged with Al 
Moulathamoun to form Al Mourabitoun. 
 
Those groups frequently exchange information, funding, hostages, and conduct joint operations 
(Walther and Retaillé 2015) as in the attack of the Malian garrison base of Aguelhok by AQIM 
and Ansar Dine in January 2012, or during the joint attack against the uranium mine of Arlit and 
the military base in Agades in May 2013 during which Al Moulathamoun and MUJAO killed 24 
soldiers and two civilians. Intergroup cooperation is made possible by the fact that Trans-
Saharan VEOs, such as MUJAO, Ansar Dine or Al Moulathamoun, are historically members of 
AQIM’s leadership network (Hagen 2014). Certain leaders, such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar, 
Abdelmalek Droukdel, Iyad ag Ghali, Mohamed Labous, or Djamel Akkacha are well known for 
having developed multiple allegiances and solidarities between MUJAO, AQIM, Al 
Mourabitoun, Al Mouakaoune Biddam and Al Moulathamoun (United Nations 2015). 
 
4. Structural and spatial analysis 
 
4.1. The spatiotemporal evolution of violence in the region 
 
The geographical distribution of violent events from 1997 to 2014 (Map 1) shows that violence 
is not widespread at the regional level. The main clusters of violence, by decreasing order of 
fatalities reported in the ACLED data, are principally located in Nigeria, Northern Algeria, 
Northern Libya, the Chad-Sudan border, and along the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria is especially 
affected by violence in North and West Africa, with 38,816 fatalities, most of them resulting 
either from ethnic violence, fights for the control of oil production in the Niger Delta, or from 
attacks from Boko Haram, which strives to overthrow the Nigerian government and establish 
Islamic law. In West Africa, the border between Chad and Sudan remains a focus of conflict due 
to persistent fighting between the Sudanese government and rebels in neighboring Darfur. The 
portion of the Gulf of Guinea that extends from Abidjan to Banjul has suffered from a succession 
of civil wars in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. 
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Map 1. Location of violent events and fatalities, 1997-2014 
 
Source: ACLED. Cartography: Walther 2015 
 
In North Africa, Algeria has also been markedly affected by violence, principally due to activity 
by three organizations in conflict with the Algerian government: GIA, GSPC, and AQMI. VEOs 
were involved in 89% of the 11,592 fatalities in Algeria. With 9,907 fatalities reported, Libya is 
the third epicenter of violence, principally because of the overall political instability that 
followed the ousting of Col. Gaddafi in 2011 and the subsequent civil war. In comparison, the 
Sahel and Sahara regions are less immediately affected by violence, with the notable exception 
of Northern Mali where secessionist rebels and VEOs have opposed the government since 2012. 
Nearly 1,000 of the 2,351 victims of violent events reported in Mali from 1997 to 2014 died in 
an event involving one or several VEOs, including AQMI, Ansar Dine, MUJAO and Al 
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Mourabitoun. In Mauritania and Niger, where VEOs have also been active, the number of 
victims resulting from clashes with VEOs is much lower, with 106 and 64 fatalities respectively. 
 
Over the last 20 years, North and West Africa have experienced episodic violence. As shown in 
Figure 2, the total number of fatalities was particularly high during the 1990s, the “decade of 
despair” for Africa due to a rise in the number of conflicts on the continent which contrasted 
with the general decline observed elsewhere in the world at the end of the Cold War (Williams 
2011, Themnér and Wallensteen 2014). 
 
Figure 2. Fatalities related to all groups (in red) and VEOs (in green), 1997-2014 
 
Source: ACLED. Calculations: Walther and Leuprecht 2015 
 
Our data, which capture the last three years of the 1990s, highlight the high number of victims 
resulting from civil wars in Liberia (1989-1997 and 1999-2003), Sierra Leone (1991-2002), and 
Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999). The return of political stability to Sierra Leone and Liberia at the 
beginning of the 2000s coincides with the beginning of the first civil war in Côte d’Ivoire (2002-
14 
2007). From the mid-2000s onwards, the rise of VEOs, shown in green, is evident. Apart from 
the peak in fatalities in 2011 due to the second civil war in Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2012), the 
majority of the victims of recent conflicts are involved in clashes with VEOs, and their number is 
on the rise. 
 
4.2. SNA of violence 
 
The starting point of our network analysis is to represent actors using a graph where each of the 
actors is represented as a node connected to the actors with which that actor is in conflict. This 
representation is known as a sociogram because the distance between the actors is a function of 
the social distance of the actors and the fatalities between them. The size of the nodes is 
proportional to their number of ties. This measure of centrality, known as degree centrality, 
emphasizes the actors that are important by virtue of their overall number of connections. The 
social network connecting VEOs from 1997 to 2014 (Figure 4) is structured around three main 
clusters: (1) the Nigerian cluster polarized by Boko Haram; (2) the Trans-Saharan cluster 
composed of Al Qaeda-affiliated groups such as GSPC and AQIM and their victims; (3) the 
Libyan cluster composed of a myriad of Islamist brigades. 
 
One of the most interesting features of the network involving VEOs is its low density. With 125 
nodes and 175 ties, the density is only 0.011, which means that only 1.1% of potential ties are 
actually present in the network. The sparsity of ties is typical of networks containing exclusively 
negative ties because the number of enemies a group can have is often more limited than the 
potential number of its allies (Huitsig et al. 2012). Low density aside, the network also has a low 
level of transitivity, which means that two actors in conflict with a third actor are unlikely to be 
in conflict with each other (Everett and Borgatti 2014). The density of transitive triads is 0.012, 
which means that in only 1.2% of the triads (a group of three actors) enemies of enemies are in 
fact enemies: in most cases (98.8%), enemies of enemies are actually friends. This is especially 
true for VEOs opposed to government forces: if both AQIM and MUJAO are in conflict with the 
Algerian military, for example, their common cause makes it less likely for them to be 
adversaries. 
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Figure 3. Violent events involving VEOs, 1997-2014 
 
Source: ACLED. Calculations by Walther and Leuprecht 2015 using ORA (Carley 2014). 
Isolates are not shown. The size of the nodes is proportional to the number of ties. 
 
A third interesting aspect of the VEO network is that actors with adverse attributes tend to be in 
conflict with one other. The tendency to interact more with actors from a different group is 
known as heterophily (Csaba and Pál 2010), which is the opposite of homophily (van Mastrigt 
and Carrington 2014). The preference for heterophilous ties can be verified using the E/I index, 
which calculates the difference between external (E) and internal (I) ties for each group of actors, 
divided by the total number of ties. When the 125 actors involved in conflict are divided into six 
categories (government, rebels, militias, civilians, Islamists, and external forces), we find that the 
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E/I index is high, positive and statistically significant (0.899***). This confirms that VEOs tend 
to clash with actors that do not belong to their category. But with which ones exactly? 
 
If we report who has been in conflict with whom over the last 20 years and calculate how many 
victims these confrontations have claimed (Table 1), we observe that the bloodiest conflicts have 
seen civilians in conflict with state and non-state actors. 
 
Table 1. Bloodiest conflicts between actors, 1997-2014 
Actor 1 Actor 2 Fatalities 
Civilians (Nigeria) Boko Haram 6409 
Civilians (Algeria) GIA Armed Islamic Group 6212 
Boko Haram Military forces of Nigeria 5447 
Civilians (Nigeria) Unidentified armed group (Nigeria) 3556 
Civilians (Nigeria) Fulani Ethnic Militia (Nigeria) 2446 
Civilians (Nigeria) Military forces of Nigeria 2382 
NLA National Liberation Army (Libya) Military forces of Libya 1740 
Christian Militias (Nigeria) Muslim militia (Nigeria) 1739 
Civilians (Libya) NATO forces 1367 
AQIM Military forces of Algeria 1074 
Military forces of Cameroon Boko Haram 1005 
Source: ACLED. Calculations by Walther and Leuprecht 2015 using ORA (Carley 2014). Note: 
a conflict can result from several events. Only the conflicts resulting in the death of more than 
1000 people are listed. 
 
Boko Haram is by far the bloodiest armed group in the region, a situation that is a function of it 
having adopted a strategy of mass killings against both Nigerian civilians (6409 victims) and 
military forces (5447). In Nigeria, many civilian victims also resulted from conflicts with 
unidentified groups (3556 victims), Fulani militias (2446), and the military (2382). Clashes 
involving the Algerian GIA and Algerian civilians were particularly deadly in the late 1990s, 
with 6212 victims reported in the database. The campaigns of civilian massacres adopted by GIA 
explain why some of its former members, such as Hassan Hattab, broke from it to form GSPC in 
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1998. Finally, a number of deadly clashes have opposed the National Liberation Army to the 
Libyan Armed Forces during the Libyan civil war in 2011 (1740 victims)). More than 1350 
victims are also reported as a consequence of NATO military intervention, mostly civilians. 
Generally speaking, these figures confirm earlier studies that showed that most of the victims of 
African conflicts were civilians who either died at the hands of state or non-state armed groups, 
or from the effects of displacement, malnutrition and disease (Williams 2011, ACLED 2015b). 
 
Most VEOs involved in conflict in North-West Africa have several types of enemies. Drawing 
on Gould and Fernandez’ (1989) typology which identifies several types of brokers based on 
their structural position, we test whether VEOs tend to be coordinators, consultants, 
gatekeepers/representatives, or liaison brokers. In a triad composed of a broker (Ab) and two 
other nodes, coordinators belong to the same group as the nodes they bridge (A--Ab--A). 
Consultants connect two nodes from a different group than their own (B--Ab--B). Gatekeepers 
and representatives connect a source or a recipient to a different group (A--Ab--B or B--Ab--A), 
while liaison brokers connect two nodes from different countries (B--Ab--C). Using the 7-type 
typology of actors previously discussed, we find that VEOs are both consultants and liaisons, 
which means that they are in conflict with two or more actors from the same category as well as 
with actors that belong to different categories. For example, AQIM is simultaneously in conflict 
with military forces from several governments in the region, civilians, the French military, and 
ethnic militias in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Algeria. The largest number of victims is related 
to clashes between VEOs and civilians (12,291 fatalities) and between VEOs and North and 
West African governments (11.283 fatalities). VEOs are also in conflict with militias (1,020 
victims), rebels (594), and external forces (426). 
 
At the actor level, we find that the network is composed of very few highly central VEOs (Table 
2). In a negative-tie network such as this, being simultaneously in conflict with many others and 
consequently presenting a high degree centrality score is widely regarded as a liability rather 
than as an asset (Labianca and Brass 2006). Negative relationships adversely affect VEOs’ 
outcomes in terms of military operations, reduce the ability of VEOs to coordinate their activities 
across the region, and limit their ability to cooperate to achieve their political or religious goals. 
Among VEOs, AQIM is unequivocally the most central actor, irrespective of the centrality 
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measures used. As can be seen in Table 2, which presents the ten most connected actors in the 
dataset, AQIM has the highest score in degree centrality and eigenvector centrality. 
 
Degree centrality is a local measure that simply counts the number of ties each group has, 
whereas eigenvector is a global measure which also takes into account the respective centrality 
of other actors and indicates whether groups have ties to actors that are themselves in conflict 
with many other actors. Actors with high eigenvector centrality are well connected to the parts of 
the network that have the greatest degree of warfare. AQIM is simultaneously involved in many 
conflicts, and is tied to other actors that also have many enemies, such as the military and police 
forces of Algeria. MUJAO, GSPC and GIA also occupy a prominent structural position in terms 
of degree centrality due to their conflicts with civilians, and military and police forces of several 
African countries. 
 
Table 2. Top-scoring nodes for selected centrality measures 
Rank Degree centrality Eigenvector centrality 
1 AQIM (0.264) AQIM (0.743) 
2 Boko Haram (0.200) MUJAO (0.421) 
3 MUJAO (0.136) Military Forces of Algeria (0.289) 
4 Ansar al-Sharia (0.120) GSPC (0.257) 
5 Ansar Dine (0.096) Ansar Dine (0.229) 
6 GSPC (0.096) Military Forces of Niger (0.222) 
7 Military Forces of Algeria (0.096) Police Forces of Algeria (0.214) 
8 Libya Shield Brigade (0.080) Military Forces of Mali (0.213) 
9 Military Forces of Libya (0.080) Civilians (International) (0.204) 
10 Al Qaeda (0.056) Civilians (Algeria) (0.201) 
Mean 0.024 0.071 
Std. Dev. 0.035 0.095 
Source: ACLED. Calculations by Walther and Leuprecht 2015 using ORA (Carley 2014). Scores 
are indicated between brackets. 
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Other prominent actors include Boko Haram, whose structural position as a central hub in a hub-
and-spoke cluster of Nigerian actors explains why it is connected to many other actors who 
themselves have few connections to one other. As the group is in conflict with virtually 
everyone, Boko Haram has a high number of ties (or degree) and, therefore, a high degree 
centrality score. Paradoxically, Boko Haram seems to achieve its goal to establish Islamic law 
and seize territory in Northern Nigeria despite having virtually no allies, a situation comparable 
to that of ISIS in the Middle East, which opposes all governments and non-state actors – 
including Al Qaeda – in the region. Some Libyan actors score high (Ansar al-Sharia, Libya 
Shield Brigade) but one should note that the Libyan cluster represented here is a partial 
representation of the multitude of actors in play in this country, due to the fact that Libyan 
militias, which are particularly numerous in the Libyan conflict, are not represented. 
 
4.4. The effect of borders 
 
The literature presumes that borders matter because they circumscribe sovereign territories that 
generate transaction costs for those who cross. The fundamental questions, then, are whether 
borders matter to VEOs in the Trans-Saharan region and, if so, what are their effects and what 
transaction costs, countervailing or otherwise, they impose on the movement of VEOs. We are 
particularly interested in whether multinational UN or multinational military missions produce 
punctuated equilibriums that result in a surge in border coefficients by virtue of having a 
measurable effect on the transborder movement of VEOs. 
 
To understand the spatiality of radical groups in the Sahel-Sahara better, we map violent events 
related to all Al Qaeda-affiliated groups over the last 10 years (2004-2014)
1
. Once the location of 
each event is known, we connect events chronologically through hypothetical lines and verify if 
the general spatial pattern of the attacks corresponds diachronically to one of the two scenarios 
described above: the ‘mobility’ scenario where groups move freely across borders, or the 
‘sanctuary’ scenario where VEOs use a particular region as a rear base. Since the ACLED 
database contains information about the location of the events that are associated to them but not 
the movements of VEOs, we use dotted lines to indicate that the spatial patters based on the 
                                                 
1
 From 1997 to 2004, most events related to the radical groups previously identified are located in Algeria. 
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location of violent events do not necessarily correspond to actual physical movements between 
places, but rather to a series of events that are related chronologically. Under no circumstances 
should our representation of spatial patterns be interpreted as a chronological reconstitution of 
actual physical movement across the Sahel-Sahara. 
 
The analysis that follows reveals no evidence of a ‘sanctuary’ pattern in which VEOs make 
systematic use a particular (border) area as a rear base from which to conduct operations and 
escape military forces. Although the spatial movement of VEOs changed markedly between 
1997 and 2014, it has always been characterized by a high level of transborder activity. Between 
2004 and 2010, long-distance movements proliferated (Map 2). During this period VEOs 
travelled extensively across borders and, in many regions of Mali, Mauritania, Algeria and 
Niger, without much risk of being apprehended. Expelled from Algeria they were tolerated by 
the Malian government of President Amadou Toumani Touré’s (2002-2012), which sought to 
capitalize on the divisions within Tuareg society and on a withdrawal of the state to administer 
the northern part of the country. Successive events repeatedly occurred hundreds or thousands of 
kilometers apart, in different countries, and without regularity, from Algeria to Mauritania, the 
Mauritanian-Malian border, and Niger. 
 
One of the best known movements of this period is also the one that marked the beginning of the 
Saharan expansion of what would become Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Between February 
21 and April 11, 2003, 32 European tourists were kidnapped in the region between Illizi and 
Amguid in Algeria by Abderazak el-Para (born Amar Saïfi) and Abdelhamid Abu Zeid (born 
Mohamed Ghadir), two radical militants of GSPC. As Algerian security forces gave chase, the 
terrorists and hostages initially journeyed of over 3000 km to northern Mali. After having spent 
several months establishing alliances with leaders of local nomadic tribes, they moved to Niger 
through the plains of Azawagh, Aïr Mountains and the Ténéré desert, and ended up in the 
mountainous area of Tibesti in Chad where they were killed or captured, a second journey of 
over 2500 km through some of the most inhospitable environment on the planet (Walther and 
Retaillé 2010). Other long-distance moves have been documented since. For example, the 
Mauritanian terrorists who killed four tourists in Aleg in 2007 subsequently moved to Mali and 
Senegal before being captured in Mauritania in April 2008. 
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Map 2. Events connected chronologically, Trans-Saharan VEOs only, 2004-2014 
 
Source: ACLED. Cartography: Walther 2015 
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A paradigm shift occurred in 2011. On the one hand, Mauritania and Algeria undertook a series 
of joint counter-terrorism operations aiming at AQMI’s military bases. Such an attack took place 
in the Wagadu forest on the border between Mauritania and Mali in June. The central 
intelligence cell created to facilitate co-ordination between Saharan and Sahelian countries, 
known as the Combined Operational General Staff Committee (CEMOC), first met in Bamako in 
April 2011. 
 
Despite these institutional initiatives, the level of regional cooperation remained low, because 
Mali was not trusted by its neighbors, which accused the government of Bamako of colluding 
with VEOs. Henceforth, Mauritania and Algeria would conduct military operations in Mali when 
they deemed their interests to be threatened by the activities of transnational groups. The 
chronological succession of attacks by AQMI in 2011 suggests a high intensity of cross-border 
movements. For example, AQMI claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in Bamako, the capital 
of Mali, on January 5, followed by a hostage taking in Niamey, Niger, three days later. These 
attacks are followed by a car bomb attack in the Mauritanian town of Adel Bagrou conducted by 
AQMI on February 1, the abduction of an Italian tourist in Djanet, Algeria, a day later, and the 
killing of a Mauritanian policeman by two members of AQMI in the region of Legsseiba near the 
north bank of the River Senegal on February 3. 
 
The year 2012 contrasts sharply with the period 2004-2011 in many ways because most events 
transpired in Mali, and to a lesser extent in Algeria. Following the fall of Col. Muammar Gaddafi 
in Libya (2011) and President Amadou Toumani Touré (2012), a provisional alliance between Al 
Qaeda-affiliated groups and secessionists rebels of the National Movement for the Liberation of 
Azawad (MNLA) launched a wide-ranging military offensive against the Malian army. Over a 
matter of weeks, all the major cities of Northern Mali were seized, including Tessalit and Kidal 
in the Adrar des Ifoghas, where the offensive started, as well as Menaka, Timbuktu and Gao. The 
new groups MUJOA and Ansar Dine were particularly active during this period and started to 
clash with their former Tuareg allies over the cities of the north of the country and main lines of 
communication. 
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Similar spatial patterns can be observed in 2013 when the French-led Opération Serval 
progressively regained control of Northern Mali. As French and Chadian troops progressed 
north, VEOs loose Kona, Douentza, Gao, Timbuktu, and are chased out of their stronghold of the 
Adrar of the Ifoghas, a mountainous stronghold. The rebels of the MNLA seize Kidal and Tin 
Zaouaten from VEOs, and clash with AQIM and MUJAO. The Algerian army also clashes with 
VEOs fleeing Mali towards Libya. As in 2012, most events in 2013 took place in Mali and 
Algeria, along a south-west-north-east axis extending from Bamako in Mali to Tamanrasset in 
Algeria. The most brazen attack was launched in January 2013 against the gas facility of In 
Amenas in Algeria where MUJAO and Al Moulathamoun coordinated their activities, resulting 
in at least 67 deaths. A decade after being expelled from Algeria, Al Qaeda-affiliated groups 
were back in the country. Later in the year, a Nigerien military camp was hit by MUJAO in 
Agades in May, military barracks were attacked in Niamey in June by Those Who Sign in Blood, 
and two French journalists were killed by AQIM in Bamako in November 2013.  
 
The spatial patterns of attacks in 2014 are similar: principally concentrated in Northern Mali and, 
to a lesser extent, in Southern Algeria, localized events resulted from the French offensive in the 
Tighaghar Mountains that killed many AQMI, MUJAO and Ansar Dine leaders, and from 
MNLA rebels clashing with MUJOA. Roadside bombs and suicide car bombings organized by 
Al Mourabitoun targeting the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in Mali (MINUSMA) became more frequent. 
 
5. Conclusion: Building regional security organizations 
 
The aim of this article was to examine the structure and spatial patterns of violent extremist 
organizations (VEOs) in North-West Africa, a region characterized by growing political 
instability over the last 20 years. Building on publicly available data, we analyzed how actors in 
conflict were structurally connected and found that the network involving VEOs had a low 
density, a low level of transitivity, and contained few central actors. These characteristics are 
typical of negative-tie networks. In the region, AQIM is unequivocally the most connected VEO, 
both in terms of the overall number of actors with which the group is in conflict, and the 
respective centrality of AQIM’s enemies. In other words, AQIM is connected to many other 
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groups that are themselves involved in many conflicts. In network terms, this is a liability 
because it reduces the number of potential alliances and opportunities for collaboration with 
other groups, denies access to resources and information for political campaigns and military 
operations, and, in general terms, reduces the structural autonomy of highly central actors. As 
might be expected from a network composed of negative ties, the network involving VEOs is 
extremely heterophilous, which means that VEOs tend to clash with actors with adverse 
attributes. This is particularly true for civilians and governments. Conflicts between VEOs and 
these two categories are orders of magnitude more deadly than conflicts between VEOs and 
militias, rebels, and external forces, such as the United Nations or foreign armies. 
 
Our spatial analysis suggests that the spatial patterns of Trans-Saharan VEOs have undergone 
significant change over the last 10 years. Between 1997 and 2004, no significant cross-border 
movement can be observed. From the beginning of the expansion of VEOs in the Sahara from 
Algeria in 2004 to their military offensive against the Malian government in 2012, the spatial 
pattern of violent events observed in the Sahara suggests extensive freedom of movement. The 
location of violent events suggests a ‘mobility’ scenario in which VEOs move freely between 
Mauritania in the West and Chad in the East without necessarily using a particular (border) 
region as a safe haven. During this period, most Trans-Saharan groups are transient and mobile 
and their spatial patterns do not suggest control-based attacks launched from across the border of 
adjacent countries with a contagion effect (Medina and Hepner 2013). Between 2012 and 2014, 
however, violent events are mainly concentrated in Mali and Southern Algeria 
 
Our results have policy implications related to the governments and external forces involved in 
deterring VEOs in the Trans-Saharan region. First, because VEOs are socially and spatially 
connected across the region, there is a need for collective security institutions that can help 
countries coordinate, build trust, and go beyond ad hoc engagements. Differences make a 
regional military alliance highly improbable. Nonetheless, building institutional capacity around 
something akin to an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Trans-Sahel region and 
West Africa, possibly but not necessarily under the aegis of the African Union, is likely to pay 
off. Precedent suggests that states outside the region will always play a supporting rather than a 
lead role. In addition to supporting UN capacity-building efforts already underway, Western 
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governments should be prepared to mount a comprehensive Whole-of-Government effort in 
support of local authorities that will minimize local footprint while optimizing outcomes.  
 
Second, the findings suggest that the social and spatial mobility of VEOs is one of their major 
strengths. Similar to the Arab revolt of the 20
th
 century during which “a highly mobile, highly 
equipped type of army, of the smallest size” defeated the immobile and defensive Ottoman 
Turkish army, military operations of Trans-Saharan VEOs are “more like naval warfare than 
ordinary land operations, in their mobility, their ubiquity, their independence of bases and 
communications, their lack of ground features, of fixed directions, of fixed points” (Lawrence 
1920: 14). This makes it particularly difficult for intelligence agencies to predict their 
movements, detect threats and anticipate attacks. The fluidity of personal allegiances and 
mobility of actors across borders in the region calls for mobile and flexible military responses, 
such as the French-led Opération Serval. Projecting the general patterns of violence in the region 
and anticipating the next move of Trans-Saharan groups, irrespective of the identity of the 
perpetrators, can only be achieved if the social and the spatial are considered as complementary 
dimensions of radical violence: crossing borders and crossing social boundaries are two sides of 
the same coin. 
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Appendix 1. Violent extremist organizations (VEOs), 1997-2014 
 
Abu Obeida Brigade, Abu Salim Martyrs’ Brigade, Al Qaeda, Al Qaqa Brigade, Al-Burayqah 
Martyr’s Brigade, Al-Salafiya Al Jihadia, Ansar al-Sharia, Ansar Dine, Ansaru, AQIM: Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, Brega Martyrs Brigade, El-Farouk Brigade, 
Falcons for the Liberation of Africa, February 17 Martyrs Brigade, Fighters of The Martyrs 
Brigade, FIS: Islamic Salvation Front, GIA: Armed Islamic Group, GMA: Mourabitounes Group 
of Azawad, GSL: Free Salafist Group, GSPC: Salafist Group for Call and Combat, Islamic 
Emirate of Barqa, Islamic State of Tripoli, Knights of Change, Libya Shield Brigade, LIDD: The 
Islamic League for Preaching and Holy Struggle, Martyrs’ Brigade, MUJAO: Movement for 
Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Muslim Brotherhood, Nawasi Brigade, Nusur al-Sahel Brigade, 
Rafallah Sehati Brigade, Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria, Those Who Signed in Blood, 
Timizart Brigade. 
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Appendix 2. Foreign terrorist organizations, safe havens and border sanctuaries, January 2014 
 
Designated Name Main areas of operation Border sanctuary 
10/8/1997 Palestine Liberation 
Front (PLF) 
Gaza, West Bank, Israel, 
Lebanon 
Lebanon (?) 
10/8/1997 Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
(PIJ) 
Gaza (West Bank, Israel, 
Syria, Lebanon) 
Lebanon (?) 
10/8/1997 National Liberation 
Army (ELN) 
Colombia-Venezuela Colombia-Venezuela 
borderlands 
10/8/1997 Basque Fatherland and 
Liberty (ETA) 
Spain, France France 
10/8/1997 Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
Sri Lanka, India India-Sri Lanka 
10/8/1997 PFLP-General Command 
(PFLP-GC) 
Syria, Lebanon, Gaza Lebanon-Syria border 
10/8/1997 Harakat ul-Mujahidin 
(HUM) 
Afghanistan, Pakistan Pakistan-administered 
Kashmir 
10/8/1997 Hamas Gaza, West Bank, Israel, 
Lebanon 
Southern Lebanon 
10/8/1997 Hizballah Lebanon and global Southern Lebanon 
10/8/1997 Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK) (Kongra-Gel) 
Turkey, Iraq, Europe Turkish-Iraqi Kurdistan 
10/8/1999 al-Qa’ida (AQ) Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Iraq, Syria, Yemen, 
Sahara, Sahel, Somalia 
and worldwide 
FATA, Brazil-Paraguay-
Argentina trinational 
region, Sahara-Sahel 
9/25/2000 Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Tajikistan 
Pakistan’s North 
Waziristan 
12/26/2001 Jaish-e-Mohammed 
(JEM) 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
India 
Indian-administered 
Kashmir 
12/26/2001 Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
India 
Pakistan-administered 
Kashmir 
3/27/2002 al-Qaida in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) 
Algeria, Mali, Niger, 
Mauritania 
Algeria-Mali, Niger-
Libya borderlands 
1/30/2003 Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) Afghanistan, Pakistan FATA 
12/17/2004 Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant 
Iraq, Syria, Jordan Syria-Iraq borderlands 
6/17/2005 Islamic Jihad Union 
(IJU) 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Central Asia (Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan) 
FATA 
9/1/2010 Tehrik-e Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP) 
Afghanistan, Pakistan FATA 
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11/4/2010 Jundallah Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan Baluchistan, Iran-
Afghanistan-Pakistan 
5/30/2012 Abdallah Azzam 
Brigades (AAB) 
Lebanon, Arabian 
Peninsula 
Southern Lebanon 
9/19/2012 Haqqani Network (HQN) Afghanistan, Pakistan  Pakistan’s North 
Waziristan 
3/22/2013 Ansar al-Dine (AAD) Mali, Libya Algeria-Mali, Libya-
Niger borderlands 
11/14/2013 Ansaru Nigeria Lake Chad Basin 
11/14/2013 Boko Haram Nigeria, Chad, Cameroun, 
Niger 
Lake Chad Basin 
12/19/2013 al-Mulathamun Battalion Algeria, Libya, Mali, 
Niger 
Algeria-Mali, Libya-
Niger borderlands 
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Arsenault and Bacon (2015). Border sanctuaries identified by 
Walther and Leuprecht (2015). 

